Is Our Model for Contention Resolution Wrong?

Randomized binary exponential backoff (BEB) is a popular algorithm for coordinating access to a shared channel. With an operational history exceeding four decades, BEB is currently an important component of several wireless standards. Despite this track record, prior theoretical results indicate that under bursty traffic (1) BEB yields poor makespan and (2) superior algorithms are possible. To date, the degree to which these findings manifest in practice has not been resolved. To address this issue, we examine one of the strongest cases against BEB: $n$ packets that simultaneously begin contending for the wireless channel. Using Network Simulator 3, we compare against more recent algorithms that are inspired by BEB, but whose makespan guarantees are superior. Surprisingly, we discover that these newer algorithms significantly underperform. Through further investigation, we identify as the culprit a flawed but common abstraction regarding the cost of collisions. Our experimental results are complemented by analytical arguments that the number of collisions -- and not solely makespan -- is an important metric to optimize. We believe that these findings have implications for the design of contention-resolution algorithms.Comment: Accepted to the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA 2017

Strategic Contention Resolution in Multiple Channels

We consider the problem of resolving contention in communication networks with selfish users. In a \textit{contention game} each of $n \geq 2$ identical players has a single information packet that she wants to transmit using one of $k \geq 1$ multiple-access channels. To do that, a player chooses a slotted-time protocol that prescribes the probabilities with which at a given time-step she will attempt transmission at each channel. If more than one players try to transmit over the same channel (collision) then no transmission happens on that channel. Each player tries to minimize her own expected \textit{latency}, i.e. her expected time until successful transmission, by choosing her protocol. The natural problem that arises in such a setting is, given $n$ and $k$, to provide the players with a common, anonymous protocol (if it exists) such that no one would unilaterally deviate from it (equilibrium protocol). All previous theoretical results on strategic contention resolution examine only the case of a single channel and show that the equilibrium protocols depend on the feedback that the communication system gives to the players. Here we present multi-channel equilibrium protocols in two main feedback classes, namely \textit{acknowledgement-based} and \textit{ternary}. In particular, we provide equilibrium characterizations for more than one channels, and give specific anonymous, equilibrium protocols with finite and infinite expected latency. In the equilibrium protocols with infinite expected latency, all players transmit successfully in optimal time, i.e. $\Theta(n/k)$, with probability tending to 1 as $n/k \to \infty$.Comment: The results of this work are included in the 11th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2018) and the 16th Workshop on Approximation and Online Algorithms (WAOA 2018

A 3-player protocol preventing persistence in strategic contention with limited feedback

In this paper, we study contention resolution protocols from a game-theoretic perspective. In a recent work, we considered acknowledgment-based protocols, where a user gets feedback from the channel only when she attempts transmission. In this case she will learn whether her transmission was successful or not. One of the main results of ESA2016 was that no acknowledgment-based protocol can be in equilibrium. In fact, it seems that many natural acknowledgment-based protocols fail to prevent users from unilaterally switching to persistent protocols that always transmit with probability 1. It is therefore natural to ask how powerful a protocol must be so that it can beat persistent deviators. In this paper we consider age-based protocols, which can be described by a sequence of probabilities of transmitting in each time step. Those probabilities are given beforehand and do not change based on the transmission history. We present a 3-player age-based protocol that can prevent users from unilaterally deviating to a persistent protocol in order to decrease their expected transmission time. It is worth noting that the answer to this question does not follow from the results and proof ideas of ESA2016. Our protocol is non-trivial, in the sense that, when all players use it, finite expected transmission time is guaranteed. In fact, we show that this protocol is preferable to any deadline protocol in which, after some fixed time, attempt transmission with probability 1 in every subsequent step. An advantage of our protocol is that it is very simple to describe, and users only need a counter to keep track of time. Whether there exist $n$-player age-based protocols that do not use counters and can prevent persistence is left as an open problem for future research.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1606.0658